'Silence is virtual': youth violence, belonging, death and mourning by Henry, William Anthony & Mullings-Lawrence, Sireita Roberta
‘Silence is Virtual’: Youth Violence, 
Belonging, Death and Mourning. 
 
William Henry & Sireita Mullings-Lawrence 
 
Introduction 
The chapter will consider how young people navigate ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ 
spaces both in the real and the virtual world and how such spaces impact 
the lived experiences of young people, who are caught up in youth crime 
and violence. It will therefore contribute to the ongoing discussions on 
youth gangs, ‘black on black violence’, youth crime and young people’s 
engagement with social media. As many young people are turning to social 
media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, to identifiably 
or anonymously express their condolences and in several instances address 
the issues that are for them the causal factors behind the loss of these young 
lives. Therefore, consideration will be given to how young people navigate 
their ‘endz’ (neighbourhoods) and how they utilise online platforms, as life 
and death spaces to communicate real, imagined and silenced emotions. 
 
The current debates regarding children and young people’s engagement 
with social media, is centred around the impact, benefit and influences it 
has as an organiser of their young lives in the virtual world. Facebook, 
Instagram and Twitter are just some of the platforms that have increasingly 
become a surrogate space for young people to communicate, especially in 
cases where real world contact is denied by various constraints.1 For 
instance: where a physical/personal appearance at a public event, such as 
a funeral or gathering, is unwise due to postcode or other rivalries which 
will place the young person in immediate danger. This has led to the 
encouraging of educators and parents to monitor young people’s usage of 
the virtual, for potential threats of cyberbullying, facebook depression, 
sexting2 and exposure to inappropriate content. These aspects of an online 
presence are explored by Boyd, who suggests that we consider: ‘Why do 
teenagers flock to these sites? What are they expressing on them? How do 
these sites fit into their lives? What are they learning from their 
participation? Are these online activities like face-to-face friendships – or 
are they different or complementary’? In line with Boyd’s questions we are 
keen to gather insight on some of the ways young people engage with the 
virtual world.3 In order to get a clear idea of what young people are exposed 
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to, what they are expressing, learning and creating in these spaces, there 
needs to be a focus on how they articulate their views by way of visual and 
audio media that are presented in multiple formats across various virtual 
platforms. 
 
Indeed many who are caught up in these acts of violence, whether as 
perpetrators or victims, fear reprisals if they physically attend the social 
gatherings, wakes or funerals of those who have lost their lives. This is 
because appreciating gang rivalry from their perspective is far more 
complex than many would imagine; the empirical approach presented here 
will highlight some of this complexity. It will also make known how the 
demand for respectability, as a means of demonstrable ‘success’ in the 
realms of criminality, manifests as the ‘road man’ mentality and largely 
determines the ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ spaces young people navigate. 
Therefore, an argument for understanding the ways in which young people 
share their lives in the public and alternative public arenas, as a conscious 
choice, will be deployed to make explicit the links between social media 
and youth crime. 
 
Background 
The chapter is drawn from empirical work the authors have been involved 
in with various cohorts of primarily BAME young people, between 12 and 
25 years old, for several years in community based settings. The data 
featured includes the demographics of the young people, in the sense of 
how they articulate areas of ‘danger’ and safety’, as well as that taken from 
other sources that offer insight into their young lives. The information 
gathered from focus groups, participant observations and interviews with 
youth practitioners, programme leaders and youth participants in these 
organisations will be featured in this account. These organisations aim to 
address the complex issues faced by young people, some of which are 
framed through issues of inclusion and education and target social 
integration, social mobility, increased confidence and increased life 
expectancy. However, the effectiveness and impact of the projects is not 
discussed in detail here, but is drawn upon to give context to the concerns 
of young people. 
 
The usage of Interviews, focus groups and observations were chosen as 
being more effective for this piece, as they enabled participants to react 
and respond to each other through naturally occurring speech, thus yielding 
a collective and an individual view into their worlds. Doing so gives 
priority to the views of the young people themselves, who too often 
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complain at being ‘silenced’ within the wider public arena, which is why 
many utilise, to the fullest, alternative sites of expression within the virtual 
world. Unsurprisingly, we noted the manner in which young people 
interact online occurs in numerous ways,4 and an observation of a summer 
photographic workshop as part of the ‘Different Endz’5 project, highlighted 
the difficulties faced in any analysis of the virtual threats they experienced 
or posed to others. The analysis was aided by one particular summer 
workshop, the main aim of which was to divert a cohort of young people, 
aged 16–25 who were at risk of gang involvement, due to heightened gang 
activity within their local community. These young people had online 
access for 15 minutes during their lunch break, with restrictions placed on 
the types of websites they could visit. Sites that featured extreme violence 
and/or pornographic material were blocked as, arguably, they reinforce 
antisocial and nihilistic behaviours.6 
 
 
Media, Polytricks and Misrepresentation 
Analysing the usage of contemporary forms of social media by young 
people, to express their innermost concerns, provides insights into their 
worlds that speak to the complexity of their relationships with the wider 
communities in which they live and operate.7 Further, in the context of their 
position as members of BAME communities within the UK, their usage of 
social media to address various issues including youth violence, death and 
mourning, provides a space for a radical rethink on what is largely regarded 
as an almost apathetic approach to ‘black on black’ violence. Indeed the 
seriousness and regularity of violent acts that are attributed to criminal 
black youth gangs, including various high profile stabbings, attempted 
murders and murders in a number of locations across the UK, make it 
necessary for the police service, local authorities and other agencies to 
establish the best ways forward in this regard. These violent acts often 
result in very public debates about who is to blame for the actions of these 
nihilistic black youth, or who is ultimately responsible for dealing with the 
consequences of their actions. Far too often what is considered 
‘newsworthy’ by the mainstream media merely serves to reinforce certain 
stereotypes through a form of ‘deviancy amplification’ that detracts from 
the real issues.8 The point is, as Carrabine suggests: 
 
the mass media now provide us with round the clock news of 
crisis, disaster and trauma; rising social mobility brings a greater 
range of experiences, expectations and troubles; technological 
innovations have brought with them immense global dangers; and 
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since 9/11 ‘new’ forms of terrorism further contribute to the 
cultural climate of fear.9 
 
Such is the manner in which these issues are framed that the black youth 
presence adds to the febrile atmosphere that feeds the ‘cultural climate of 
fear’, because at its core is an investment in the pathological notions of 
black youth as another thing that needs to be ‘fixed’ in ‘Broken Britain’. 
This means that the blame for their antisocial behaviour is not regarded as 
a consequence of living within an inherently racist, classist and sexist 
society. Rather it is squarely laid at the door of the black community in 
general and the black family unit in particular, who themselves are 
criminalised in myriad ways; finding themselves under ‘endless pressure’ 
as noted by Pryce.10 For example, by not taking into account ‘the materialist 
socialisation’ of these youth, means that their proneness to ‘being victims 
of crime and especially violent crime’ is overlooked.11 This situation 
worsened for the black community whose disproportionate representation 
in the Criminal Justice System is well documented, because ‘the 1998 
Crime and Disorder Act criminalises children, young people and their 
parents’.12 An Act that was introduced by New Labour and further endorsed 
by ex-prime minister Blair at the Callaghan lecture in Cardiff in 2007, 
when he confessed that he was ‘lurching into total frankness’ and stated 
the need for an: 
 
intense police focus on the minority of young black Britons 
behind the gun and knife attacks. The laws on knife and gun gangs 
needed to be toughened and the ringleaders taken out of 
circulation.13 
Blair failed to consider the history of racial oppression that structurally 
placed the black community at a disadvantage, socially, culturally and 
politically in the wider public arena, where as suggested by Les Back ‘new 
ethnicities’ are in flux and are therefore fluid and not fixed as Blair 
implies.14 The suggestion is that intensifying a ‘police focus’ on the 
minority within a minority can be counterproductive if the drivers for this 
behaviour are collapsed into mere criminality, as is often the case in such 
matters. Indeed the scandal surrounding the Tory MP Oliver Letwin’s 
comments, in a joint memo to then prime minister Thatcher (regarding the 
riots that took place in various London boroughs in 1985), enable us to 
understand the racial climate at that time. More importantly, the fact is that 
he was, and still is, responsible for creating/influencing public policy, is 
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telling when considering how his racist values were central to his political 
views: 
 
The root of social malaise is not poor housing, or youth 
‘alienation’, or the lack of a middle class… Riots, criminality and 
social disintegration are caused solely by individual characters 
and attitudes. So long as bad moral attitudes remain, all efforts to 
improve the inner cities will founder.15 
Moreover, according to Ashton in her study of black male prisoners and 
how they located their sense of belonging as UK citizens, one youth asked 
her ‘if being a gang leader counted as a formal identity’.16 This is important 
to understand because the role the public and alternative public arenas play 
in moulding and shaping the identities of many of these black youth are 
the recipients of various forms of inequality that are known but seldom 
publicly addressed in any meaningful way. Moreover, when such issues 
are raised, especially in the context of mainstream schooling and how it 
obscures a positive black historical presence, ‘we are accused of political 
indoctrination and teaching black kids how to hate whites’.17 Consequently 
it is the black community as a homogenous mass that is held to account for 
incidents that, according to Blair, are deemed a consequence of their 
inability to control their young people. However, Carby suggests that this 
type of behaviour represents ‘the cycle of pathology’; a consequence of 
black British youth being forcibly socialised into a culture of social 
practices that do not reflect their lived reality, as ‘identifiable others’ in 
the land of their birth.18 Hence: 
 
Though the memo in which Mr Letwin made these claims is now 
some three decades old, there is a clear public interest in exposing 
the attitudes and values that once guided a still-serving member 
of the British Cabinet.19 
It is the ‘exposure of these attitudes’ that is important here for two main 
reasons. Firstly, because Letwin speaks of ‘black areas’ which in truth 
makes little sense in the context of a UK demographic: secondly, lost in 
the Letwin debate was Thatcher’s written comments stating how 
‘disturbing’ the contents of the memo were, and how there is a need for a 
heightened police presence in these communities. However, the fact that 
in the news items Thatcher’s ‘acceptance’ of the language and sentiments 
of the memo was not interrogated, speaks to how ingrained this worldview 
of the black community was, and still is, as those who will never belong to 
Britain. More importantly, this is not new news to the recipients of white 
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racism within the cultural milieu that is the black community, because any 
sense of belonging is always undermined by some type of sobering 
experience that is passed on anecdotally from generation to generation. 
That is why according to one respondent: 
 
You asked me what does it mean to belong? Well it fucking well 
ain’t dealing with this all the time. I know what they (white 
people) say about us and some of it’s true ‘cos I know people who 
do things. But, you know, most of us don’t get involved but I can 
understand why some do because if their parents went through the 
same shit as they are now, at school in the streets from 
everywhere. You’re gonna say fuck it I belong with my own and 
for nuff youts that’s the gang.20 
The fact that these young people are primarily integrated into, and educated 
about, British culture via the state schooling system’s National 
Curriculum, as well as other agencies of socialisation, must be considered 
when discussing their supposed ‘educational underachievement’ and gang 
affiliation. This lack of consideration results in the emphasis being placed 
on the black family as a pathological unit rather than the structural 
inequalities and deficient parenting styles that impact on the life chances 
of the white working classes in a similar fashion. There is also a denial of 
the experiences of racism as a psychological factor.21in any meaningful 
way, with regard to the omission of positive forms of self-identification in 
these young lives, where being black does ‘not sit easily with being 
British’.22 For instance, debates about a positive black historical presence 
are too often undermined and discredited in a very public way, as 
evidenced in the following news item: 
 
GCSE students are to be taught that some of our nation’s earliest 
inhabitants were Africans who arrived here long before the English. The 
Mail on Sunday has discovered that the extraordinary rewriting of our 
island’s history – the politically correct work of a Marxist academic – will 
be offered to thousands of history students throughout England from 
September. Its creators claim the course addresses the ‘white male-
dominated’ view of history – but it has outraged some of Britain’s most 
eminent thinkers. Booker and Nobel prize-winning novelist V.S. Naipaul 
said: ‘Once again political correctness is distorting our history and the 
education of our children.’ And historian Sir Roy Strong, author of The 
Story Of Britain, said: ‘This stands history on its head, projecting back on 
to the past something that isn’t true.’23 
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The point is what is arguably lost in this type of media driven ‘historical 
correctness’, is the role it plays in further undermining the self-esteem, 
self-value and self-worth of the very young people who need these positive 
influences. Moreover, educators and practitioners who work with gang 
affiliated young people, or those who are impacted by gang culture or 
youth violence, recognise immediately that these public debates also 
undermine their credibility in the eyes of these young people. 
Consequently, this paradoxical argument sits parallel with the current 
misrepresentation of some black youth, where the hooded top is not read 
as an innocent youth style or necessity for warmth but has become a symbol 
of disorder coded with negative perceptions. Unsurprisingly, Prime 
Minister Cameron once stated ‘we the people in suits often see hoodies as 
aggressive, the uniform of a rebel army of young gangsters’.24 Similarly, 
Osgerby makes reference to a series of newspaper articles in both The 
Sun and the Daily Mirror where headline stories made attempts to 
demonise black youths as folk devils, stating ‘there are slippages between 
media stereotypes of youth-as-fun and youth-as-trouble’.25 Similarly, The 
Runnymede Trust’s report (Re)thinking gangs speaks to the problems 
inherent in the construction of the gang through the image of Black youth 
and suggests: 
 
The correlation of gang cultures and criminal activities with 
young Black boys serves to collectively implicate and criminalise 
all Black boys and the Black community.26 
Unsurprisingly then, according to one gang-affiliated young person: 
 
Can you guarantee me a job if I do my school work? No you can’t 
and I can make more in a week than I’d make working. All that 
black history stuff you go on about is long and probably aint true 
anyway.27 It won’t help me hold and my bres hold our corner and 
protect the Ps.28 
Jason speaks to the very conscious choices certain young people make 
when faced with ‘that black history stuff’, which for them has no bearing 
or relevance to their future social trajectories. For this reason, in the next 
section an insight will be provided into how these young people use a 
notion of belonging that is wrapped up in how they gain, or garner, 





Reputation, Belonging and Youth Violence 
For young people who turn to alternative modes of money making, a public 
or private space is not only a place they ‘inhabit but a place they may be 
called upon to defend’, as their ‘turf’ association is arguably their foremost 
means of identifying self and other.29 Crucial to understanding the idea of 
‘turf’ association, such youth make ‘an effort to organise hierarchies as a 
way of gaining some control’ over the aspects of their lives they are seen 
to ‘own’ and ‘control’.30 Gaining control is one aspect of territorialising 
their space; it requires the manipulation and organisation of persons, 
implemented through a hierarchy in which power is disseminated in a top-
down fashion. The hierarchy generally consists of family members, friends 
and peers, and the power is distributed by ‘elders’/ ’shotters’, who give 
instructions and organise the ‘business’ side that will generate the Ps. They 
instruct/ command the ‘youngers’/ ‘tinies’/ ’soldiers’, followed by 
‘wanabees’, ‘associates’, and fantasy members who choose to align 
themselves with the group because they are looking for kudos and not gang 
membership. Pitts accurately sums up the current situation arguing that ‘in 
certain parts of our towns and cities, and among certain social groups, life 
has become far more dangerous for children and young people’.31 Efrem 
noted that gangs are ‘stuck in their post codes by the world wide web’ and 
a ‘false sense of security’ is created as they now also use videos to mark 
territory.32 However, the common belief is that the nihilistic behaviour of 
inner city youth generally perceived as ‘minority’ groups and ‘gang’ 
affiliated, impacts on the movement and public perceptions of all youth 
who live within the urban landscape, because: 
 
Gang turf is more than a collection of streets, alleys, stores, and 
street corners; it is sacred ground that is the site of struggles for 
identity, power, and status. It is a hallowed space that gives the 
gang its meaning. It is where members learn group norms and 
publicly display their group membership and loyalty, and it acts 
as a tangible reminder and repository of the gang’s history and 
values.33 
The young people featured here are aware of the ‘gangs’ that operate in 
their area and where some may not know the actual gang members 
personally, they are knowledgeable of the names and colours that are 
associated with specific areas. In some cases ‘these names reflect the actual 
postcode that young people have assigned themselves to’, as in the case of 
E9 Balance (East London E9).34 Where the post code is not embedded in 
the name, alternative labels are created that become sub sets derived from 
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the areas of origin, such as the south-east London based ‘Gypset crew’ of 
Gipsy Hill and ‘Bluisham boyz’ in Lewisham. Interestingly, in some 
instances the colours associated with the local ‘gangs’ are taken from the 
colour of the dustbins in their area, so for instance in Lewisham the rubbish 
bins are generally coloured blue; hence blue-borough equals 
‘bluisham’.35 In some instances acronyms such as PDC for Poverty Driven 
Children or Peel Dem Crew become associated with an area in much the 
same way as the postcode, as one participant expressed for instance, ‘when 
you hear PDC everyone knows they repp Briky [represent Brixton]’.36 
 
Unlocking these codes and processes for naming and claiming turf sheds 
light on the manner in which some young people imagine and narrate 
themselves as something other than just mindless, nihilistic, gang-
affiliated youth. For instance, within these names that in some cases 
resemble mission statements, there are clear objectives behind them that 
make known to those who are privy to these codes, exactly what is at stake 
in peaceful or conflict situations. Spergel notes that ‘the symbolic names 
are more important and enduring for gang function and 
tradition… inscribed… along with gang names on the walls… as a threat 
to other gangs’ (Spergel 1995).37 Consequently, they will understand that 
PDC is in one sense Poverty Driven Children, but PDC can also stand for 
the Peel Dem Crew. Similarly, Don’t Say Nothing (DSN) of Croydon, 
Shine My Nine (SMN) of Thornton Heath, Spare No One (SN1) of 
Peckham and South Man Syndicate (SMS) of Stockwell and Brixton, speak 
to the realisation that the mapping of turf, in this fashion, goes hand in 
hand with perceived areas of safety and danger. As such these young 
people now yield an alternative form of empowerment that presents itself 
in the claiming of place and the resymbolising of locality, which involves 
the redrawing of their local map and the construction of ‘informal’ 
boundaries that are not to be crossed or disrespected. The warnings are no 
longer limited to the medium of graffiti on a wall or public object, but are 
evidenced in virtual spaces, as ‘strategies of spatial organisation are deeply 
bound up with the social production of identities’.38 In other words whilst 
this ideas of control, representing, respecting and the acquisition of power 
are being played out, there is the simultaneous production of identities that 
often reduces young people to violent perpetrators of ‘gang crime on 
road’.39 Moreover, where their aim is to protect those in their communities, 
they run the risk of ‘victimising others who are not involved’ but simply 




For many black youth an active participation in so called ‘gang culture’, 
offers an alternative form of social empowerment through a culture of 
respectability and belonging that is ultimately self-destructive. 
Consequently they are often oblivious to the problems associated with this 
lifestyle, especially when it comes to mapping out a future that is not 
associated with some form of petty or serious criminality. This is because 
‘the police or prison doesn’t bother us. Our generation just want more 
things. We’re addicted to the hustle’.41 This attitude speaks to the 
importance of understanding these formal and informal sites of learning, 
where the immediate acquisition of ‘more things’ outweighs the long term 
benefits of the traditional route to these ends via formal education; that 
which for them is regarded as ‘long’.42Unsurprisingly then, the manner in 
which gang affiliation and other forms of criminal activity serve as an 
organising principle in what is in effect a culture of abstention, needs to be 
fully understood. For instance, knowing what you can earn per day 
(a wage) depending on what your hustle is, to what age-graded sentence 
you can expect if you get caught with say drugs or a weapon, is crucial. 
The point is many see the ‘streets’ as an alternative learning environment 
and if they are gang-affiliated they will be ‘educated’ in all things to do 
with survival on the streets, which includes dealing with living in a racist 
society. In many ways this speaks to Back’s notion of the ‘metropolitan 
paradox’ where ‘momentary escapes from racism are contiguous with ever 
more complex forms of racial power and domination’, which can be read 
through the way they posture on the same streets.43 Moreover, what is 
important for us to appreciate is that any state reaction to youth crime that 
does not take into account how these young people view respect through 
the acquisition of ‘more things’, becomes problematic, for, as Krinsky 
states: 
 
Human behaviors acquire their meanings within specific social 
contexts. Disapproving social reactions to deviant behaviors 
dictate their significance even for those who engage in them. 
Therefore, to understand deviance as fully as possible, researchers 
must explain not only the motives behind particular uncondoned 
activities, but also, and just as importantly, the fundamental 
causes of society’s responses.44 
The notion of ‘uncondoned activities’ becomes central to this argument 
because the social imbalances that are recognised by many young people 
as a by-product of living in a racist society, partially explain why many 
withdraw from various aspects of community life and adopt a ‘soldier 
mentality’ whilst operating within ‘alternative cognitive 
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Landscapes’.45 For them, exercising distance from the wider community is 
therefore a very conscious choice, which makes explicit the links between 
educational underachievement as a consequence of a seeming failure at 
school, and respectability as a consequence of success in the realms of 
criminality ‘on road’. We therefore need to understand the pull factor of 
the forces at play that make crime into an appealing career and a pathway, 
for certain black youth who embrace an anti-school culture, in which a 
hyper-masculinity that actively encourages embracing the ‘road-man 
mentality’ is promoted; literally and virtually.46 As such a discussion on 
expressive spaces where they can achieve a sense of belonging is crucial 
to understanding the school/on road dichotomy because, as was suggested 
above, they operate within ‘alternative cognitive landscapes’, where ’on 
road’ success is often coupled with the prevalence of instances of black 
youth violence. However, as will be explored in the next section, this 
notion of ‘on road’ success or even failure, is now being played out in the 
expressive space that is the virtual, where acts of violence too often 
translate into the physical world. Unsurprisingly then, within these virtual 
spaces we witness lamentations as well as reflections of ‘life on road’ and 
what it means to be alive, ‘I woke up this morning with tears in my eyes, 
knowing LiL Z is nowhere to be seen. I have to give thanks for what God 
has done to save me.’47 
 
Territorialism, Silence, Death and Mourning in 
the Virtual 
Determining ‘failure’ or ‘success’, in the virtual cannot be distanced from 
the social media sites where these matters are debated, discussed and made 
visible through young people’s online presence.as found in game spaces 
such as Gangster War, Mafia Wars, Gang War, and Gang Nations. These 
game spaces feature all forms of extremely graphic violence that is 
conducted during the acquisition of weapons, drugs, money, mansions and 
girls/ women. In fact social media has essentially created a new mode of 
gang activity where public performance and viewership have become just 
as important as guarding a physical territory. In fact we see an extended or 
alternative form of territorialism taking place through online convergence, 
as the Internet as a ‘convergence space’ is one where gang conflicts 
amongst young people are intensified and new ones created.48 Here virtual 
social worlds are made publicly visible, which often overlap with the real 
world where many young people do not recognise the embedded histories 
that are being played out in their day-to-day lives. As a result, 
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contemporary youth who are struggling to find their place in the landscape 
of Britain often find themselves marginalised, confined to boundaries that 
ironically result in a shrunken territory. The shrinkage, which is also 
virtual, happens because of the fear or discomfort that young people 
experience when travelling ‘freely’ across London. The result is a form of 
self-imposed sanction that ends up confining them to the communities in 
which they live, thereby contributing to forms of ‘self-exclusion’.49 This 
partially explains why they aim to develop their own sense of security and 
identity, one where they define their own precepts of inclusion and 
exclusion, as a form of ‘neighbourhood nationalism’.50 More importantly: 
the long-term implications of being socialised into a culture rooted in 
networked publics are unknown… teens live in a society whose public life 
is changing rapidly.51 
The rapid change that Boyd speaks of is evidenced in the public social 
media (SoMe) profiles of these young people, through which they express 
aspects of their young lives.52 However, what is paramount is that through 
such profiles, we learn that in addition to the emergence of virtual 
reputation-building, many are uncomfortable with not being able to freely 
navigate their neighbouring streets. As a result a form of alternative 
territorialism, in both real and virtual spaces, has become one of the 
underlying navigational issues for urban youth. This is because what 
occurs in the real world is transferred to the virtual and vice versa, which 
is the current case between groups from Brixton and Peckham. 
Consequently, this alternate territorialism is a claiming of ‘overlapping 
territories’ that in the first instance is borne from the rifts caused by various 
groups/ gangs representing or ‘reppin’ an area. This needs consideration 
because the online acts of violence, far too often exacerbate the existing 
tensions within and between groups of young people from different 
communities. For instance, in the case of youths from Peckham and 
Brixton clashing, the original reasons for the ongoing feuds have become 
blurred and then remade in ways that make sense in the current moment. 
Moreover, Brixton and Peckham are not the only boroughs that have ‘beef’ 
with each other; Peckham is said to have a history of disputes with ‘New 
Cross, the Old Kent Road and Stockwell’.53What is of interest is that these 
conflicts appear to have no specific point of departure, as such what it 
means to ‘rep’ (represent) an area and the mechanisms employed to defend 
their ‘endz’ (the areas in which youth live), becomes their key focus. 
However, as stated above, for many of these young people the history 
behind these forms of territorialism remains unknown, which means the 
patterns of behaviour are based on cultural retentions, transferred from 
generation to generation and taken for granted by each generation of young 
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people. This is evidenced in YCTV2’s documentary ‘Know Your Endz’ 
which has been written and produced by young people for an audience of 
their peers. It highlights these postcode rivalries and emphasises the 
contentions between SW2 and SE15, as well as E8 with NW1. When asked 
to explain these rivalries, it was suggested: 
 
It’s about the street you’re from the street your reppin, the street 
you have grown up in… if someone comes into your endz and 
disrespects your street then you’re not going to take it… I am not 
going to let no one disrespect my endz… if you disrespect my 
endz then obviously I am going to come down on you hard… if 
anyone can walk through your area then you have no control of 
what’s happening.54 
The above reads like a scene from the 1979 American gang movie ‘The 
Warriors’55 but tellingly speaks to the way in which gangs operate in the 
real world, or non-virtual space, as discussed extensively 
elsewhere.56 Consequently, the way that gangs interact in the virtual has 
become an increasing area of interest, because the tensions that have 
emerged as a result of gang rivalry today are transferred and intensified 
online. For instance, the murders of more than 100 young people through 
gun and knife crime during 2015, has led some of the young participants 
in the ‘Different Endz’ project, to respond to the deaths of friends and 
family members in the virtual through real concerns over their physical 
safety. Crucially, whilst working with this cohort, their YouTube and 
FaceBook profiles curated with images, videos and comments in the form 
of lamentations, allow access to what these young people are experiencing 
and expressing. These lamentations shed fresh light on how multiple social 
media platforms fit into the lives of young people in very interesting ways, 
as what they gain through such participation is a voice that would normally 
have been violently silenced. The reason for this is again wrapped up in 
this notion of ‘reppin the endz’, because mourning for, or showing 
sympathy to, the wrong person(s) can have extremely dire consequences 
that transcend gang rivalries, as innocent family members or friends, are 
often caught up in the maelstrom. 
 
These concerns were evidenced during the project, whilst searching 
through the numerous YouTube links that pay tribute to the lives of lost or 
‘fallen soldiers’, from which the young people discovered that they were 
far from alone in grieving over the deaths of lost ones. Moreover, the 
participants revealed that many young people living in London, between 
the ages of 15 to 25, either know or are associated with someone who has 
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died via gun or knife violence. Consequently, YouTube and Facebook are 
two spaces where notes written to friends and peers who have passed away, 
have been found to be useful in making sense of their willing or unwilling 
involvement as innocents, mere associates or gang members. Here, the 
Internet facilitates young people’s use of social media to mourn and engage 
their peers, through expressions and lamentations that differ from 
traditional modes of tributes to the dead. In some senses these novel 
cultural practices amongst young people, form a community of active 
participants in the emergence of ‘digital grave makers’ that cater for those 
who visit sites and spaces for mourning online. Virtual cemeteries and 
virtual mourning have arisen as a result of our ‘electronic culture’ and have 
become a significant part of death and dying rituals amongst young 
people.57 There is an increasing field of research that focuses on how death 
and grief are dealt with on various online platforms and social media, 
which speaks to ‘how the Internet and social media may be changing our 
ways of grieving and mourning’ and our concepts of death and 
bereavement.58 
 
Haley, a young person from the project, brought forward an explanation of 
the term ‘Different Endz’ or different ends, to explain how it speaks to 
‘changes’ in the process of grieving and mourning that highlights the 
importance of the virtual mourning space. She commented on the sanctity 
and preciousness of life as featured in many of the online tributes (see 
below), whilst acknowledging the abrupt ending of the lives of the young 
people she referred to as ‘the fallen soldiers’; young people who were 
personally known to her who have been killed on the street. The 
significance of discussing the death of ‘fallen soldiers’, was to encourage 
the young people to openly discuss their views on gun and knife violence, 
and reflect on their own lives and life chances in their local communities. 
Haley’s reference and tribute to the ‘fallen soldiers’ spoke to the way in 
which memorial tributes of ‘fallen soldiers’, were not only visited online, 
but they also offered insight into the sentiments behind the sudden loss of 
a young life, where somewhat disturbingly: 
 
Killing each other may not be the way forward as there is no 
guarantee that your name will make the headlines… so it’s really 
about the number of hits an online profile gets.59 
The above partially explains the growth of these online networks where 
mourning is central, as evidenced in the tributes made to 15 year old Zac 
Olumegbon, affectionately known as Lil Zac from Tulse Hill, south-east 
London. Zac was said to be a member of the TN160 (Trust no one) gang and 
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was stabbed to death by rivals from the GAS (Grind and Stack/ Guns and 
Shanks) gang outside the Park Campus School he attended in West 
Norwood, south-east London. Young people identified two R.I.P. video 
tributes to LiL Zac, produced by Maximum Recordings: one clip filmed on 
an estate in Tulse Hill, has a total of 73,350 hits with 626 likes and 13 
dislikes, whilst the other clip has a total of 114,842 hits, 695 likes and 19 
dislikes. Yet whilst the performers in the video clip make clear that ‘TN1 
is not a gang but they are family’, what emerges from these productions 
are the manner in which young people choose to express their feelings of 
hurt, loss and confusion as a result of the level of violence that occurs 
amongst themselves and their peers. However, these hits represent and 
symbolise the vast increase in the ways young people are able to reach 
large audiences at a rapid speed, in the relative safety of their homes. 
Although, despite the ‘false sense of security’ they gain from marking 
territory in the virtual, a perhaps unforeseen result of their online presence 
is an uncanny sense of value for life, as displayed in many of the R.I.P. 
videos they observed.61 Tellingly, the R.I.P. videos attributed to another 
‘fallen soldier’, Jozey–Joel Morgan, share exactly the same sentiments. 
Jozey, a 17-year-old at the time of his death, grew up in Southwark, south-
east London and moved to Lambeth during his mid-teens. He was affiliated 
with the GAS gang and later died, not through gun or knife crime, but in a 
car crash. Yet at his funeral, ‘gunmen from an unknown rival gang’ were 
reported to have opened fire, killing 21-year-old Ronnie Azezur Khan, a 
funeral attendee and friend of Jozy.62 
 
From the above it is clear that the dangers of attending a funeral of anyone 
caught up in youth violence are real and explains why social media 
facilitates grieving and mourning ‘publicly’, as a viable alternative for 
these young people. In this way the manner in which they conceptualise 
death and bereavement, as heavily associated with say for instance gang 
culture, sheds light on an increase in social media use, where virtual 
cemeteries have become a symbol of alternative youth expression. Thus 
with the advent of technology and the enabling of young people to create 
elaborate online profiles, expressing their feelings and opinions about the 
harsh realities and consequences of youth crime and violence, through 
various forms of media, continues to grow. Tributes are therefore made 
and shared publicly along with the views, feelings, hopes and aspirations 
from friends of the deceased, which allows us to witness these youthful 
constructions of self, through these R.I.P. tributes that become both a 





The chapter has made an argument for understanding how it is that young 
people share their lives in public and alternative public arenas, as a 
conscious choice, making explicit the links between social media, gang 
culture and youth crime. By doing so and actively listening to voices that 
may be silent, or have been silenced for one reason or other, provides an 
opportunity to make sense of the situations and difficulties they often find 
themselves in. It also allows us to witness the shift in how young people 
respond to their rapidly changing environments, the physical and the 
virtual, countering the notion that they are generally apathetic to their 
social situations. Far too often they find themselves legislated for, and done 
to, but generally they are ignored, not listened to and therefore remain 
largely unheard in the wider public arena. As such, where young people 
share their own musings on current affairs, or events that directly impact 
their lives in some way, shape or form, it is important for us to listen to 
and understand them in the confines of their expressive spaces. 
 
When these virtual social worlds are made publicly visible, we notice an 
overlap with the real world, where many young people do not recognise 
the embedded histories that are being played out in their day-to-day lives. 
As a result, contemporary youth who are struggling to find their place in 
the landscape of Britain, often find themselves marginalised and confined 
to boundaries not of their own making; those that have been passed down 
generationally which ironically result in them contesting a shrunken 
territory; their turf. The novel aspect of the shrinkage is it now extends to 
the virtual, due to the fear or discomfort that young people experience 
when travelling ‘freely’ across London, which results in a form of self-
imposed sanction that ends up confining them to the communities in which 
they live, thereby contributing to forms of ‘self-exclusion’.63 
 
The above partially explains why they aim to develop their own sense of 
security and identity, one where they define their own precepts of inclusion 
and exclusion, as a form of ‘neighbourhood nationalism’.64Consequently, 
for many young people loyalty is tied to their territory, resulting in an 
uncanny ‘postcode pride’, which has a different set of morals based on 
pride and respect. On one hand the area or postcode is honoured by those 
who live there, on the other the postcode is used as a means to build a 
‘reputation’, where respect is often earned through intimidation, extreme 
violence and fear. For this reason, consideration has been given to how 
young people navigate their neighbourhoods and how exactly it is that they 
are utilising these platforms as life and death spaces to communicate their 
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positions and emotions. However, virtual reputation building has become 
a strategy for many young people to navigate their cities with confidence, 
marking out safe and unsafe spaces both in the real and the virtual worlds. 
 
Moreover, the above enables us to view and experience a new mode of 
connectivity created by young people, where public performance and 
increasing viewership, demonstrable by the number of viewings a post has, 
have become just as important as making known the territorialisation of a 
physical space. Similarly, through this work we have seen that young 
people utilise the social media sites to express their emotions, especially 
when it comes to mourning the ‘fallen soldiers’, creating a common space 
amongst them for discussions of loss and condolence. It is therefore clear 
that, through the idea of turf war, repping the ends and gaining respect, 
young people organise their own structures, systems and hierarchies as a 
way of gaining some level of control over their lives. As a result we learn 
that such spaces have somewhat replaced, and in other instances enhanced, 
traditional face-to-face friendships or rivalries, as the ‘virtual’ acts as an 
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